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has never been acted on in the practical working of the law. So
far from agreeing with Wightman and Erle, JJ., that the fact of
there, having been hitherto no decision expressly declaring the liability of lodging-house keepers, is a proof that they are right in
their judgment, we submit that it is just as admissible as a proof
that they are wrong: for a rule of law perfectly understood and
generally acted upon, is for that very reason seldom the subject of
the decision or dictum of a Court in banco.
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In the Supreme Court of the United &ate8, -DecemberTerm, 1854.
WILLIAM rONTAIN, APPELLANT, VS. WILLI&M RAVENEL.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
1. A testator devised as follows: "Forasmuch as there will be a'surplus -income
of my estate beyond what will be necessary to pay my said wife's annuity and
the other annuities, I do therefore direct my said executors to invest the said
surplus income and all accumulation of interest arising from that source yearly,
for and during all the term of the natural life of my said wife, * * * * and from
and immediately after the decease of my said wife, then all the rest, residue and
remainder of all my estate, *****
I authorize and empower my executors,
or the survivor of them, after the decease of my said wife, to dispose of the same
for the use of such charitable institutions in Pennsylvania and South Carolina as
they or he may deem most beneficial to mankind, and so that part of the colored
population in each of the, said States of Pennsylvania and South Carolina shall
partake of the benefit thereof." All the executors of the will died before the testator's widow, and without halving attempted to make an appointment under the
power conferred on them. Hed, That the disposition of the residuary estate of
the testator, subject to the power of appointment of the executors, failed, and
that the heirs and next of kin of the testator were entitled to it.
2. No Court of Chancery, either in South Carolina or Pennsylvania,.can administer
the fund in question, and it remains unaffected by the bequest, because the means
through which it was to have been given and applied have failed.
3. In England, when the Chancellor directs the application of property which
has been the subject of an ineffectual charitable disposition, in accordance with
the will of the sovereign, indicated under the sign-manual, or when that officer
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himself executes the cypres power in regard to such property, he does not act in
the discharge of his ordinary.chancery powers.
4. No special trust is vested in the executors, by reason of this power of appointmeni. It is separable and distinct from their ordinary duties and trust as executors. It was to be exercised after the death of the wife of the testator; but the
executors died before her decease, and consequently they had no power to make
the appointment The conditions annexed by the testator to the power rendered
the appointment impossible.
5. There must be some creative energy to give embodiment to an intention which
was never perfected. Nothing short of the prerogative power, it would seem, can
reach this case. There is not only uncertainty in the beneficiaries of this charity,
but there is a more formidable objection-there is no expressed will of the testator. He intended to speak through his executors, or the survivor of them, but by
the acts of Providence this has become impossible. It is then as though he had
not spoken, and no power can now speak for him except that of theyarmnspatri.
G. When there is nothing more than a power of appointment conferred by the testator, there is nothing on which a trust, on general principles, can be fastened.
The power given is a mere agency of the will, which may or may not be exercised
at the discretion of the individual. And if there be no act on lAs part, the property never having passed out of the testator, it necessarily remains as a part of
his estate. To meet such cases, a prerogative power, such as that of the king,
in England, must be invoked, which there, through the "Chancellor, can give
effect to the charity.
7. Some late decisions in England, involving charities, evince a disposition rather
to restrict than enlarge the powers exercised on this subject An arbitrary rule
in regard to property, whether by a king, or chancellor, or both, leads to uncertainty and injustice.

The nominal plaintiff below, who is the appellee, is the administrator of the estate of the decedent de honis non cum testamento
annexo. His interest is with the defendant, as he and his family

are the next of kin and heirs at law of Mr. Kohne.
The bill is filed by certain charitable societies of Philadelphia, in

the name of the plaintiff, and it claims the appropriation of the
residuary estate of Mr. Kohne, for themselves, and the other
charitable societies of Pennsylvania and South Carolina, under the

directions contained in Mr. Kohne's will, (which is hereinafter
recited): first seeking to recover from the defendant, as executor of

Mrs. Eliza Kohne, so much of that estate as came to her hands, as

the executrix of Mr. Kohne's will, and which she distributed as
undisposed of property, after the death of her co-executors.
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Mr. Kohne, the testator, was a native of the kingdom of Prussia,
and came to this country in the year 1789; immediately thereafter
he established himself in business in the city of Charleston, South
Carolina.
There was some evidence to show that his domicil remained
unchanged during his whole life; and on the other hand, there was
evidence that, at the time of his death, his legal residence was in
Philadelphia.
Mr. Kohne, the testator, died oh the 26th of May, 1829, leaving
a large amount of real and personal estate, of the then value of
about $611,000, exclusive of his real estate. at Charleston. By his will, which is dated April 28, 1829; he gave to his wife
certain personal property, and an annuity of $10,000, with the
power of appointing a sum of $10,000 by her will, and he also devised to her the residue of his Charleston real estate and his Philadelphia dweling house and country seat, for.the term of her life,
authorizing and empowering her to dispose of a portion of his
Charleston real estate, "to such religious institution or institutions,
in fee simple, and for such purposes as she might see fit."
The testament closes with the provision, which gives rise to the
present controversy, "forasmuch as there will be a surplus income
of my estate, beyond what will be necessary to pay my said wife's
annuity and the other annuities, I do therefore. direct my said
executors to invest the said surplus income, and all accumulation of
interest arising from that source yearly, for and during all the
term of the natural life of my said wife, in the purchase of such
stocks or securities of the United States, or the State of Pennsylvania, or of any other State or States of the United States, or
of the City .of Philadelphia, bearing an interest, as they, in their
discretion, may see fit; and from and immediately after the decease
of my said wife, then all the rest, residue and remainder of all my
estate, including the fund which shall have arisen from the said
surplus income aforesaid, after paymeilt of the legacies hereinbefore
directed to be paid after the decease of my said wife, and after
providing for the payments of the annuities hereinbefore given of
those annuitants who -may then still be living, I authorize and em-

FONTAIN vs. RAVENEL.

power my executors, or the survivor of them, after the decease of
my said wife, to dispose of the same for the use of such charitable
institutions in Pennsylvania and South Carolina as they or he may
deem most beneficial to mankind, and so that part of the colored
population, in each-of the said States of Pennsylvania and South
Carolina, shall partake of the benefit thereof; and I do hereby
farther authorize and empower them, or the survivor or survivors
of them, after my said wife's decease, for the better and more easy
disposing of my said residuary estate, as aforesaid, to sell, and to
make and execute good uand sufficient deeds and conveyances of real
estate, not hereinbefore specifically disposed of, to the purchaser
or purchasers thereof, his, her, or their heirs and assigns, in fee
simple."
The executors thus authorized and empowered, after the decease
of the testator's wife, to dispose of his surplus estate with its accumulations, were his wife, his "respected friends John Bohlen and
Roberts 'Vaux, of the City of Philadelphia," and his "respected
friend Robert Maxwell, formerly of Charleston." All of the excu-

tors died before the wife of the testator.

Mrs. Kohne died in the

City of Ptbiladelphia, on the 1st day of March, 1852.
Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal in chancery, from the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The case involves the construction of the will of Frederick Kohne.

He first settled in Charleston, South Carolina, where he engaged in
active business and accumulated a large fortune. For many years
before his death, his residence was divided between Charleston and
Philadelphia. At the latter place he added much to his wealth in
the acquisition of real and personal property. He had furnished
houses in both cities, and a country-house in the neighborhood of
Philadelphia. Until his health became infirm he resided a part of
the year in the South, and the other part in the North. In May,
1829, he died in Philadelphia, where his will was made and published
in the month of April preceding his death. In his will he declared
himself to be of the city of Philadelphia.
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After giving several annuities to his wife and others, and-legacies
to his friends in this country and in foreign countries, to charitable
objects, and providing for the payment of them, he declares, " forasmuch as there will be a surplus income of my estate, beyond what
will be necessary to pay my said wife's annuity and the other annuities, I do therefore direct my said executors to invest the said surplus income and all accumulation of interest arising from that source
yearly, for and during all the term of .the natural life of my said
wife, in the purchase of such stocks or securities of the United
States or the State of Pennsylvania, or of any other State or States
of the United States, or of-the city of Philadelphia, bearing an interest, as they in their discretion may see fit; and from and immediately after the decease of my said -wife, then all the rest, residue and
remainder of all my estate, including the fund whichshall have arisen
from the said surplus income aforesaid, after payment of the legacies
hereinbefore directed to be paid, after the decease of my said wife, and
providing for the payment of the annuities hereinbefore given, of those
annuitants who may then be still living, I authorize and empower my
executors or the survivor of them, after the decease of my said wife
to dispose -of the same for the use of such charitable institutions in
PennsylvAnia and South Carolina as they or he may deem most
beneficial to mankind, and so that part of the colored population in
each of the said States of Pennsylvania and South Carolina shall
partake of .the benefits thereof." His wife, Eliza Kohne, John
Bohlen and Roberts Vaux, of the city of Philadelphia, and Robert
Maxwell, of the city of Charleston, were appointed executors.
Mrs Kohne survived her co-executors some years, and then died,
having made her last will and -testament, and appointed James L.
Petigru and William Ravenel the defendant, executors, the latter
of whom obtained letters testamentary in the county of Philadelphia.
And on the 15th of October, 1852, William Fontain, the complainant, obtained letters of idministration de bonis non, on the estate of
Frederick Kohne, deceased; he being the nearest of kin to the
deceased, and one of his heirs at law.
The bill is filed in the name of the complainant, by certain charitable societies of Pennsylvania and South Carolina, under the directions
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of the will, to recover from the defendant, as executor of Mrs. Kohne,
so much of the property as came to her hands as the executrix of
her husband's will, and which she distributed as undisposed of property, after the death of her co-executors. And the question in the
case is, whether the residuary bequest in the will, which authorized
his executors or the survivor of them, after the death of his wife, to
dispose of 'the surplus "for the use of such charitable institutions in
Pennsylvania and South-Carolina as they might deem most beneficial to mankind," has lapsed, no such appointment having been made
or attempted to be made during the lifetime of the executors. This
part of the property is understood to have amounted to a large
SUm.
The domicil of the testator, at the time of his death, seems not
to be a controverted question. He had so lived in the two States
of Pennsylvania and South Carolina, and amassed property in both,
that his domicil might be claimed in either. There is no evidence
in which, if in either, he exercised the right of suffrage. For two
years- previous to his death he resided in Pennsylvania.
The bequest -under consideration was intended to be a charity.
The donor, having entire confidence in bis executors, substituted
their judgment for his own. They, or the survivor of them, was to
designate such objects of his charity in the two states "as would be
most beneficial to mankind." It was to be placed on the broadest
foundations of human sympathy, not excluding the colored race.
It is no charity to give to a friend. In the books it is said, the
the thing given becomes a charity, where the uncertainty of the
recipients begins. This is beautifully illustrated in the Jewish law,
which required the sheaf to be left in the field for the needy and
passing stranger.
It may be admitted that this bequest would be executed in England. A charity rarely, if ever, fails in that country. The only
question there is, whether it shall be administered by the chancellor
in the exercise of his ordinary jurisdiction, or under the sign manual
of the Crown. Thus furnished with the judicial and prerogative
powers, the intent of the testator, however vaguely and remotely
expressed, if it be construed into a charity, effect is generally given
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to it. It is true, this is not always done in the spirit of the donor,
for sectarian prejudices, or the arbitrary will of the king's instruments, sometimes pay little or no regard to the expressed will of the
testator.
The appellants endeavor to sustain this charity, under the laws
of Pennsylvania.
This is according to.the course of the court.
The case of The Philadelphia Baptist Association vs. Bart's
Executors, 4 Wheat. 1, was decided under the laws of Virginia,
which had repealed the statute of 43 Elizabeth. In Beatty vs.
Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566, the pious use of a burial-ground was sustained under the Bill. of Rights of Maryland. The case of Wheeler
vs. Smith, 9 How. 55, was ruled under the laws of Virginia. And
in the case of Vridal vs. GWrard's Executors, the laws of Pennsylvania governed.
In Wheeler vs. Smith, this court said, when this country achieved
its independence, the prerogatives of the Crown devoled upon the
people of the States.
And this power still remains with them,
except so far as they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal
Government. The sovereign will is made known .to us by legislative
enactment. The State, as a sovereign, is the parenspatrite.
There can be no doubt that decisions have been made in this
country on the subject of charities, under the influence-of English
decrees, without carefully discriminating whether they resulted
from the ordinary exercise of chancery powers, or the prerogatives
of the Crown.
The courts of the United States cannot exercise any equity
powers, except those conferred by acts of Congress and those judicial powers which the high Court of Chancery in England, acting
under its judicial capacity as a court of 6quty, possessed and exercised, at the time of the formation of the Constitution of the-United
States. Powers not judicially exercised by the chancellor, merely as
the representative of the sovereign and by virtue of the king's prerogative as parens patrie,are not possessed by the circuit courts.
In 2 Story's Eq. 431, it is said: "But as the Court of Chancery
may also proceed in many, although not in all, cases of charities by
original bill, as well as. by commission under the statute of Eliza-
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beth, the jurisdiction has become mixed in practice; that is to say,
the jurisdiction of bringing informations in the name of the attorney-general has been mixed with the jurisdiction given to the chan_
cellor by the statute. So that it is not always easy to ascertain in
what cases he acts as a judge, administering the common duties of
a ,court of equity; and in what cases he acts as a mere delegate of
the Crown, administering its peculiar duties and prerogatives. And
again, there is a distinction between cases of charity, where the
chancellor is to act in the Court of Chancery, and cases where the
charity is to be administered by the king, by his sign-manual. But
in practice the cases have been often confounded from similar causes."
"It is a principle in England that the king, as parens patrce,
enforices public charities, where no person is entrusted with the
right. Where there is no trustee, the king, by his lord chancellor,
administers the trusts as the keeper of the king's conscience; and it
is not important whether the chancellor acts as the special delegate
of the Crown, or the king acts under the sign-manual, his discretion
being guided by the chancellor."
It may be well again to state the precise question before us. "The
executors or the survivor of them, after the decease of the testator's
wife, was authorized to dispose of the property, for the use of such
charitable, institutions in Pennsylvania and South Carolina as they
or he may deem most beneficial to mankind.",
No special trust is vested in the executors, by reason of this
power of appointment. It is separable and distinct from their ordinary duties and trust as executors. It was to be exercised after the
death of Mrs. Kohne; but the executors died before her decease,
and consequently they had no power to, make the appointment.
The conditions annexed by the testator rendered the appointment
impossible. Had the contingency of the death of Mrs. Kohne happened, as the testator from her advanced age contemplated, during
the life of the executors or the survivor of them, the appointment
might have been made at his or their discretion. But had they or
the survivor of them failed to make it, it might have become a question whether he or they could have been coerced to do so by the
exercise of any known chancery power in this country. The will
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contained no provision for such a contingency, and it could not be
brought under the trust of executorship. Chancery will not compel
the execution of a mere naked power. 1 Story's Eq., sec. 169.
But it will, under equitable circumstances, aid a defective execution
of a power. A power when coupled with a trust, if not executed
before the death of the trustee, at law the power is extinguished,
but the trust, in chancery, is held to survive.
The testator was unwilling to give this discretion to select the
objects of his bounty, except to his executors. He relied on their
discrimination, their judgment, their integrity and fitness, to carry
out so delicate and important a power. He made no provision for
a failure in this respect, by his executors or the survivor of them,
nor for.the contingency of their deaths before Mrs. Kohne's decease..
They died before they bad the power to appoint, and now what remains of this bequest, on which a Court of Chapcery can act?
There must be some creative energy to give embodiment to an
intention which was never perfected. Nothing short of the prerogative power, it would seem, can reach this case. -There is not
only uncertainty in the beneficiaries of this charity, but behind that
is a more formidable objection. There is no expressed will of the
testator. He intended to speak through his executors or the survivor of them, but by the acts of Providence this has become impossible. It is then as though he had not spoken. Can any power
now speak for him, except the yarens patrie? Had he declared
that the residue of his estate should be applied to certain charitable
purposes, under the statute of 43 Elizabetl, or on principles similar
to those of the statute, effect might have been given to the bequest,
as a charity, in the State of Pennsylvania. The words, as to the
residue of his property, were used, in reference to the discretion to
be exercised by his executors. Without their action, he did not
intend to dispose of the residue of his property.
It is argued, "that in England the chancellor, in administering
charities, acts as the delegate of the Crown, inasmuch as he discharges all his judicial functions in that capacity." If by this it is
intended to assert, that the chancellor, in affixing the sign-maanual
of the king, or when he -acts under the cy-pres power, is in the dis-
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charge of his ordinary chancery powers, it does not command our
assent.
The statute of 43 of Elizabeth, though not technically in force
in Pennsylvania, yet by common usage and constitutional recognition, the principles of the statute are acted upon in cases involving
charities. Witmon vs. Lex, 17 Serg. & Rawle, 88.
In the argument, the case of Maggridge vs. Thackwell, 7 Yes.
86, was cited, as identical with the case before us. "The only difference between that case and this one, it is said, is, that in the
former the devise was for objects not defined, as they are in this
case." In this the counsel are somewhat mistaken, as the case of
Maggridge will show.
The devise in the will of Ann Cam was, "and 'I give all the rest
and residue of my personal estate unto James Vaston, of Clapton,
Middlesex, gentleman, his executors and administrators, desiring
him to dispose of the same in such charities as he shall think fit,
recommending poor clergymen who have large families and good
characters; and I appoint the said John Maggridge and Mr. Vaston,
before mentioned, executors of this my will."
In the final decree "upon a motion to vary the minutes, Lord
Thurlow declared, that the residue of the testatrix's personal estate
passed by her will, and ought to go and be applied to charity," &c.
Now here was a trust created not only in Yaston, but in his
executors and administrators, to whom the residue of the estate was
bequeathed for the purposes of the charity. In this view, Lord
ThTirlow might well say, "the residue of the personal estate passed
by the will." This was true, though Vaston was dead when the will
took effect. This being the case, it is difficult to say that that case
is identical with the one before us.
The .case of Maggridge vs. ThackwelU was before Lord Eldon on
a rehearing. He entered into a general view of the subject of*
charities by the citation'of authorities, which showed the unreasonableness of the doctrine maintained by the courts, the inconsistencies
in the decisions in such cases, and the gross perversions of charities
by the exercise of the prerogative power; but at last he says:
"Therefore I rather think the decree is right. I have conversed
18
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with many upon it. I have great difficulty in my own mind, and
have found great difficulty in the mind of every persoii I have consulted; but the general principle thought most reconcilable to the
cases is, that where there is a general indefinite purpose not fixing
itself upon any object, as this in a degree does, the disposition is in
the king by sign-manual; but where the execution is to be by a
trustee with general or some objects pointed out, there the court will
take the administration of the trust. But," he observes, "it must
be recollected that I am called upon to reverse the decree of a predecessor, and of a predecessor who, all the reports inform us, had
great occasion to consider the subject. I should hesitate with reference to that circumstance; but where authority meets authority, and
precedent clashes with precedent, I doubt whether I could make a
decree more satisfactory to my own mind than that which has been
made."
It will be perceived that this decision was made reluctantly, and
after much balancing of the law and the force of precedents, and
chiefly, as it would seem, in respect to the decree of Lord Thurlow.
This decision of Lord Eldon was made in 1802, and it'is not known
to have been recognized in this country.
Neither the doctrines on which this decision is founded, nor, the
doubts expressed by the chancellor, are calculated very strongly to
recommend it to judicial consideration. The case, however, is different from the one before us in this: the residuary estate of Mrs.
Cam passed to the trustee; that of Mr. Kohne remained as a part
of his estate in the hands of the executors, and descended to his
heirs at law on the death of Mrs. Kohne. The beneficiaries were
not more definitely described in the one case than in the other. In
Kohne's case no trust was created, except that which was connected
with the executorship.
Where there is nothing more than a power of appointment conferred by the testator, there is nothing on which a trust, on general
.principles, can be fastened. The power given is a mere agency of
the will, which may or may not be exercised at th6 discretion of the
individual. And if there be no act on his part, the propertytnever
having passed out of the testator, it necessarily remains as a part of
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his estate. To meet such cases, and others, the prerogative power
of the king, in England, has been invoked, and he, through the
chancellor, gives effect to the charity.
I It would be curious as well as instructive, on a proper occasion,
to consider the principles, if principles they can be called, which
were first applied in England to charities. Their most learned
chancellors express themselves, in some degree, as ignorant on this
subject. Lord Eldon said, in the case of Maggridge, "in what the
doctrine originated, whether, as Lord Thurlow supposed, in the
principles of the civil law, as applied to charities, or in the religious
notions entertained formerly in this -country, I know not; but we
all know there was a period when a portion of the residue of every
man's estate was appropriated to charity, and the ordinary thought
himself obliged so to apply it, upon the ground that there was a
general principle of piety in the testator."
In the above case, Lord Eldon again says: "In Clifford vs.
Francis,this doctrine is laid down: that when money is given to
charity, without expressing what charity, there the king is the disposer of the charity; and a bill ought to be preferred in the attorney general's name. I cite this (he says) to show that it contains
a doctrine precisely the same as the Attorney Generalvs. iyderfin,
and the Attorney Generalvs. Matthews. - So those three cases (he
says) seemed to have established, at the year 1679, that the doctrine
of this court was, that where the property was not vested in trustees,
and the gift was to charity generally, not to be ascertained by the
act of individuals referred to, the charity was to be disposed of not
by a scheme before the master, but by the ing, the disposer of such
charities in his character of parens patriem.
Some late decisions in England, involving charities, evince a disposition rather to restrict than to enlarge the powers exercised on
this subject. An arbitrary rule in regard to property, whether by
a king or chancellor, or both, leads to uncertainty and injustice.
In a late case of Clark vs. Taylor, 21 Eng. Law and Eq., 308,
a gift by will to a particular charitable institution maintained voluntarily by private means, the particular intention having ceased:
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held that the gift was not to be disposed of a, a charitable gift
cy-pres, but failed and fell into the residue."
In the case of the Baptist Association, Chief Justice Marshall
says, there can be no doubt that the power of the Crown.to superintend and enforce charities existed in very early times; and there
is much "difficulty in marking the extent of this branch of the royal
prerogative before the statute. That it is a branch of prerogative,
and not a part of the ordinary powers of the chancellor, is sufficiently certain." And in the case of the Attorney General vs.
-hood,Hayne's Rep. 630, it is said: "The court of chancery has
always exercised jurisdiction in matters of charity, derived from the
Crown as parens patrim."
In the provisions of the act of Pennsylvania defining the powers
of a Court of Chancery, in 1836, it is declared, "that in every case
in which any Court, as aforesaid, shall exercise any of the powers of
a Court of Chancery, the same shall be exercised according to the
practice in equity, prescribed or adopted by the Supreme Court of
the United States."
In June, 1840, an act extended the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court within the city and county of Philadelphia, in chancery, in
cases of "fraud, accident, mistake, or account ;" and since then an
act has beenc passed giving the Orphans' Court power, where a
vacancy happens in a trust, to fill it, and also power to dismiss
trustees, executors, &c., for abuse of their trusts, &c. But no
statutory provision is found embracing the case before us.
The chancery powers are of comparatively recent establishment
in the State of Pennsylvania, and it does not appear that the cy-pres
power is given, and in the exercise of jurisdiction it seems to be
disclaimed.
In Eing vs. .Rundle, 15 Barber, 189, "there being a number of
charitable bequests to several charitable bodies, the remainder was
bequeathed or devised to the Protestant Episcopal Society for certain purposes, &c.; the bequests to the religious bodies were held
invalid, and so of the remainder over, as not being statutory tests.
In Yates vs. Yates, 9 Barber, 324, the Court say: "We come to
the conclusion, that as a court of equity we possess no original inhe-
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rent jurisdiction, to enforce the execution of a charitable trust
void in law, as contravening the statute against perpetuities, as
being authorized. In this case, where the use is a pious one, additional reasons might be urged against the exercise of such jurisdiction, were it important. Unless this trust'will stand the statutory
test to be applied to it, it must fall.
In the will of Sarah- Zane, Mr. Justice Baldwin, sitting in Pennsylvania, and speaking of trustees, says, "theywill be considered
as trustees acting under the supervision of this Court as a Court of
Chancery, with the same powers over trusts as courts of equity in
England and the courts of this State profess and exercise." " When
the fund shall be so ascertained as to be-capable of a final distribution, it will be directed to be applied exclusively to the" objects
designated in the will, as they existed at the time of her death, and
shall continue until a final deciee; if any shall then appear to have
become extinct, the portion bequeathed to such object must fall into
the residuary fund as a lapsed legacy. Its appointment to other
purposes or kestuis que trust than those which can by equitable
construction be brought within the intention of the will of the
donor, is an exercise of that branch of the jurisdiction of the Chancellor of England which has been conferred on this Court by no
law, and cannot be exercised, virtute offlicii, under our forms of
government."
And again, in Wri.qh vs. Linn, 9 Barr, 488, Bell, J., says:
"Though in the statute of 48 Elizabeth, c. 4, relating to charitable
uses, has not in terms been recognized as extending to Pennsylvania,
we have adopted not only the principles that properly emanate from
it, but, with perhaps the single exception of cy-pres, those which by
an exceedingly liberal construction the English courts have engrafted
upon it."
In the Methodist CMurch vs. Remington, 1 Watts, 226, the Court
says: "The original trust, though void, was not a superstitious
one; nor if it were, would the property, as in England, revert to
the State, for the purpose of being appropriated in eodem genera,
as no Court here possesses the specific power necessary to give effect
to the frinciple of cy-pres, even were the principle itself not too
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grossly revolting to the public sense of justice to be tolerated in a
country where there is no ecclesiastical establishment."
In Ray vs. Adams, 3 lMylne & Keen, 237, it was held, "that
where a power is by will given to a trustee, which he neglects
to execute, the execution of the trust devolves upon the Court; but
if, in the events which happen, the intended trustee dies before
the time arives for the execution of the trust, and the trust therefore fails, the testator is to be considered as having so far died
intestate.
In the case of Ommanney vs. ButcAer, 1 Turn. & Russ. 260,
a testator concluded his will: "In case there is any money remaining, I should wish it to be given in private charity." Beld, "if the
testator meant to create a trust, and the trust is not effectually
created or fails, the next of kin must take."
There appears to be no law or usage in South Carolina that. can,
materially, affect the question under consideration. It seems to be
conceded, that if this charity cannot be administered by this Court
in the State of Pennsylvania, it cannot be -made available by the
laws of South Carolina.
After the investigation we have been able to give to this important case, embracing, the English chancery decisions on charities as
well as our own, and the cases decided in Pennsylvania, we are not
satisfied that the fund in question ought to be withdrawn from those
who are in possession of it, as the heirs of Frederick Kohne. There
does not appear to us to be any safe 'and established principle, in
Pennsylvania, which, under- the circumstances, enables a Court of
Chancery to administer the fund. It has not fallen back into the
estate of the testator, because it was not separated from it. It
remains unaffected by the bequest, because the means through which
it was to be given and applied have failed. The decree of the Circuit
Court is, therefore, affirmed.
-
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In the Court of Appeal8 of New York-In -Equity.
BRYANT BURWELL vs. AMANSEL D. JACKSON.

AMANSEL D. JACKSON vs. BRYANT BURWELL.
1. A covenant "to make a good and sufficient deed of conveyance" is not satisfied
by the execution of a deed good in point of form only; there is an implied
undertaking to make a good title.
2. In an executory agreement to purchase land, the purchaser is not bound to examine the title before entering into the agreement,'and if the title prove defective
upon examination, the vendee cannot be compelled to take it.
3. The implied warranty of the vendor ceases upon the execution of the deed, as
the vendee is presumed to have examined the title and to be satisfied with it.
4. The cases of Gazely vs. Price, and Parkervs. ParmZee, commented on.
5. The covenants in this case are dependent covenants, and the execution of the
deed is a condition precedent to the payment of instalments subsequent to the
first.
6. Where the title of a vendor who has covenanted to convey is totally destroyed,
the vendee is not bound, either to offer to perform on his par, or to require performance by the vendor, but may treat the contract as rescinded.

On the first day of June, 1835, an agreement was made, under
the hands and seals of the respective parties, between James D.
Bemis, Pierre A-. Barker, John W. Clark, and Roswell W. Haskins,
of the first part, and Arenton J.Douglass, of the second part, by
which the said Bemis and his associates agreed, that, on the performance by said Douglass of the covenants on his part, they would
"execute, or cause to be made and executed, unto the said party of
'the second part, or his legal representative or representatives, on
thefirst day of June, 1836, a good and sufficient deed of conveyance of a certain lot of land in the city of Buffalo," describing it.
Douglass, the party of the second part, covenanted as follows:
"to pay for said lot of land the sum of two thousand five hundred
dollars, in ten equal annual payments, with annual interest on the
whole sum; the first instalment of the interest which shall then
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have accrued to be paid on the first day of June, 1836, at which
time, and on delivery of the deed aforesaid, a bond and mortgage
for the remaining purchase money shall be executed by the party
of the second part, or his legal representative or representatives,
payable as above, stipulated."
The agreement also contained a provision, that in case of nonperformance by Douglass of any of the covenants on his part, Bemis
and his associates might re-enter, and that all the rights of Douglass under the agreement should thereupon cease.
The lot described in the agreement was part of a large tract of
land, then owned by the parties of the first part, in the city of Buffalo, which tract was subject, at the date of the agreement, to several mortgages, covering the whole or separate portions thereof;
and among others, to a mortgage for twenty thousand dollars, given
by the said Pierre A. Barker to Mark H. Sibley, for the purchase
money of a portion of the said tract. These mortgages were all on
record in June, 1835, when the agreement was made.
Prior to June, 1836, the defendant in the original suit, Amansel
D. Jackson, purchased the interest of Douglass in the agreement
for the sum of one thousand dollars, and took an assignment from
Douglass, with the consent of Bemis and his associates.
On the 8th day of June, 1836, Jackson paid the sum of one hundred and thirty-three dollars, in cash, upon the contract, and gave
his note for two hundred and ninety-two dollars, which was accepted
in full of the first instalment, due June 1st, 1836.
On the 18th July, 1836, the four proprietors, Bemis and others,
executed and acknowledged a deed of the lot described in the agreement, and also prepared a bond and mortgage to be executed by
Jackson, and left -both the deed and the bond abd mortgage in the
hands of their clerk, where they remained, nothing further having
been done in regard to them-; and nothing more was ever paid, or
offered to be paid, by Jackson, upon the contract.
By some arrangement between the four proprietors, the note of
Jackson for $292 became the property of John W. Clark, who
brought an action in his own name, and in May, 1838, recovered a
judgment for the amount of the note.
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In April, 1838, the four proprietors made a partition among
themselves of the whole tract, by which the lot in question was
assigned, together with other parcels, in severalty to the said
Pierre A. Barker, it being provided by the deed of partition, that
the portion so assigned in severalty to the said Barker, should
be subject to the said mortgage from him to Mark H. Sibley. The
contract with Douglass was also assigned to Barker by the partition
deed.
An execution was duly issued upon the judgment against
Jackson to the Sheriff of Erie County, where he resided, and returned
nulla bona.
In December, 1889, the judgment was assigned to the plaintiff,
Burwell, for the consideration expressed in the assignment, of one
dollar, which was the only evidence of any payment by Burwell.
In 1846, the mortgage from Barker to Sibley was foreclosed by
the assignee of Sibley, and the premises, including the lot in question, were sold under a decree of the Court of- Chancery, and conveyed by the master to Walter Joy, the purchaser at the sale.
In May, 1847, the plaintiff, Burwell, filed a creditor's bill, being
the bill in the original suit, to enforce the collection of the judgment
on the note, containing the -usual allegations; and in November,
1849, he also sued out an attachment against Jackson, under the
provisions of Article 1, Title 1, Chap. 5, Part 2, of the Revised
Statutes, for the purpose of collecting the same judgment, upon
which the property of Jackson was seized by the sheriff; and in
order to secure a discharge of the property, a bond was executed,
with sureties, pursuant to the statute, upon which bond a suit .as
commenced by the plaintiff, Burwell, to which the defendant therein
pleaded, and which is still pending.
Three of the original proprietors of the said tract of land, to wit:
Barker, Clark, and Haskins, became insolvent as early as 1889 or
1840. The fourth, Bemis, has always been and is still solvent.
Jackson put in an answer to the original bill, setting up as a defence, among other things, the foregoing facts, with the exception
of those relating to the suing out of the attachment: and subsequently filed a cross-bill, alleging the same facts, and also the fact
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of the issuing and execution-of the attachment and the subsequent
proceedings thereupon: and praying for a perpetual injunction
against the collection of the judgment.
The original and cross suit were referred to a sole referee to hear
and decide, who sustained the bill in the original suit, and directed
the appointment of a receiver, and an assignment by the defendant
in the usual form in that suit, and a dismissal of the bill in the
cross suit.
The Supreme Court in the Eighth District confirmed the report,
and gave judgment for the plaintiff in the original suit, and for the
defendant in the cross suit. From this judgment the defendant in
the original suit, and plaintiff in the cross suit, appealed to this
Court.
The opinion of this Court was delivered by
J.--,This case will be rendered comparatively simple, by
considering, first, what would be the rights of the parties, in case
the original vendors had retained their interest in the note, and had
themselves obtained the judgment and filed the creditors' bill, and
sued out the attachment in their own names: Because, if the defendant in the original suit would have had no defence as against
them, he can have none as against the plaintiff, Burwell. On the
other hand, if we arrive at the conclusion, that the defence set up
would be good, if the note had been sued and the creditors' bill filed
in the names of the four original proprietors of the lot in question,
we have then only to see what there is in the case to give to the
plaintiff, Burwell, any other or greater rights than the vendors
themselves would have had.
Viewing the case in this light, it becomes indispensable in the
outset, to put a construction upon the main covenant contained in
the original agreement on the part of the vendors. It can never be
known which party is in default, until their mutual obligations are
ascertained.
The vendors agreed, that on the performance by the purchaser of
the covenant on his part, they would "execute, or cause to be made
and executed, unto the said party of the second part, or his legal
SELDEN,
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representative or representatives, on the first day of June, 1836, a
good and sufficient deed of conveyance of a certain lot of land, &c."
Is this covenant satisfied, by the execution of a deed good in point
of form merely, or does it require such a deed as will convey a good
title to the land sold ?
If those obvious principles of natural justice which the law applies
to analagous cases, are to be applied to this, it would seem that the
question here presented ought not to admit a serious doubt. Upon
every sale of a chattel, the law implies . warranty on the part of
the vendor, that he isthe owner of the property and has a right to
convey, although nothing whatever is said on the subject.
This is not an arbitrary or accidental rule, but one which rests
upon a solid foundation of reason aiid justice. It is fair and just to
presume that a vendor knows the nature and extent of his own
right. The vendee has not the same means of knowledge. To
require a vendor, therefore, to make good the title to that which he
assumes to sell, is simply requiring him to guaranty that he is not
committing a fraud.
It is a principle universally recognized by all civilized codes, that
whenever a thing sold has some latent defect, known to the seller,
but not to the purchaser, the former is liable for this defect, unless
he discloses his knowledge on the subject to the latter, before the
completion of the sale. The doctrine of implied warranty of title
rests upon the same principle. The only difference is, that in case
of a defect in title, knowledge by the vendor is presumed, but when
the defect is in quality merely, the common law requires it to be
proved.
It is obvious that the reason upon which this doctrine is based,
applies no less to sales of real than of personal estate. Moral writers, and writers upon natural law, make no distinction between the
two cases. Cicero de Off. 8, 13; Grotius de Jure, &c., 1, 2, ch. 12,
see. 9. Neither does the civil law. 1 Domat, part 1, book 1, title
2, see. 10, art. 6, et seq; Pothier on Cont. of Sale, sec. 82, 87, et
seq. I think, too, that the common law, notwithstanding the many
subtle distinctions and modifications of the rule which it has adopted,
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will be found to have adhered, substantially, to this acknowledged
principle of right. Some of its earliest rules are based upon it.
Originally, the customary words of conveyance in a deed,
amounted to a warranty; as the word dedi in a feofment, or concesai
in a grant for years. Coke Litt. 384, a. This doctrine had its
foundation in the principle of implied warranty of title. The words
demise and grant in a lease, are still held to import a covenant for
quiet enjoyment. arannis vs. Clark, 8 Cow. 86. But the same
rule has not been applied to the operative words ordinarily used in
the more modern forms of conveyance; and since the case of Frost
vs. Baymond, 2 Caines, 188, it has been regarded as settled in this
State, that, neither the words grant, bargain, sell, alien or confirm,
when used in a conveyance of real estate, import a warranty. We
have a statute, also, which provides that "no covenant shall be implied in any conveyance of real estate." 1 R. S. 738, sec. 140.
The practice has now become universal, both in England and in this
country, for purchasers to protect themselves by procuring the insertion of express covenants in their deeds of conveyance; and it Is
found to be most consonant to justice, to apply the maxim caveat
emptor to such cases, and to require the purchaser to look to his
express covenants alone.
But neither this rule, nor the reason upon which it is founded,
applies to executory agreements to sell and convey lands infuturo.
In respect to such agreements the principles upon which the doctrine of implied warranty rests, are still applied, as well in England
as in this country, with all their force. It has been repeatedly held
in England, that a purchaser is never bound to accept a defective
title, unless he expressly stipulates to take such title, knowing its
dcfects; and these decisions have been made without any regard to
the particular language of the agreement to purchase. They rest
upon the principle of implied warranty of title, and can have no
other basis. White vs. Foljambe, 11 Vesey, 887; .Deverill vs.
Lord Bolton, 18 Vesey, 508; Waring vs. Macl reth, Forrest, 129.
It seems never to have been doubted that this was the rule in
case of a slale of a freehold, nor of a leasehold, so far as the right
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of the vendor to the lease itself was concerned; but it was for a
long time a disputed question in England, whether upon a sale of a
mere leasehold interest, the vendor was bound to show, not only
that he owned the lease and had authority to sell it, but that the
original lessor had power to create the term. This question was
finally settled by the Court of Exchequer in 1821, in the case of
Purvis vs. Bayer, 9 Price, 488. In that case it was held, after
great deliberation, that if a contract be made for the sale of leasehold property unconditionally, and without a stipulation in terms,
on the part of the vendor, that-he meant to sell is interest only,
and that he would not warrant the lessor's title, he is bound to show
the right of the original lessor to grant the lease.
The Lord Chief Baron in this case rests his decision upon the
general principle, that every vendor, whether of lands or of goods,
impliedly warrants his title to be good to what he sells; the only

question being whether that rule, in case of a sale of a mere leasehold interest, extended to the title of the landlord. He says:
"The principle applies to everything; and there seems to me to be
no sound reason why leaseholds should be an exception. If an
estate of inheritance be sold, it is admitted on all hands, that the

vendor must produce his title; and why, then, is a purchaser
bound to take a lease for a term of years, in equity or honegty,
although after he has paid the purchase-money, it may not last an
hour."
But it may be said, that this last case, as well as those previously
cited, arose in equity, and that it may well be that a Court of Equity
would not enforce a specific performance, while at law the purchaser
would be bound. There is, however, no doubt that the rule at law
is the same as in equity.
The case of Doe vs. Stanion, 1 Mees. & Wels., 695, was an action
at law. The purchaser in that case was the tenant of the vendor.
The agreement to purchase was in the following terms :-" 1881,
September 2d. Samuel Stanion purchased an estate in the parish
of Corbey, bought of Robert Gray, at the sum of X100. Received
on account 101. Mr. Robert.Gray is willing to let the same lie by
paying 4 per cent." This agreement was signed by the parties,
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and 101. deposit paid. It was held that there was an implied warranty of title in that case. PARKE, B., in giving his opinion, says:
"Is, then, the contract in question a contract of this conditional
nature: to purchase for X100, provided a good title should be made
and the estate transferred? We conceive that there is no doubt
but that it is to be so construed; for in the first place, in contracts
for the sale of real estate, an agreement to make a good title is
always implied, of which the case of gouter vs. Drake, 5 Barn. &
Adolph. 992, is a strong instance."
The case here referred to by Baron Parke, was*an action at law
to recover the price agreed to be paid for a leasehold estate. The
agreement on the part of the plaintiff, was simply to assign the
lease and deliver up possession, and this he offered to do; but the

defendant refused to pay, because the plaintiff did not show . good
title in the originallessor. The Court held the defendant right*in
refusing. Chief Justice Denman says: "For the reasons above
given, we come to the conclusion, that, unless there be a stipulation
to the contrary, there is in every contract for the sale of a lease,
an implied undertaking to make out the lessor's title to demise, as
well as that of the vendor to the lease itself, which implied undertaking is available at law as well as ih equity."
These cases seem never to have been disputed. They are referred to, and recognized in, the latest editions of Sugden's ILaw'of
Vendors, as sound expositions of the law. It is clear, therefore,
that in England there is in every executory contract for the sale
of klnds, whatever may be the language in which the agreement is
couched, an implied undertaking to make a good title, unless such
an obligation is expressly excluded by the terms of the agreement.
In this State, also, the decisions have generally been in accordance
with this principle of the-common law. Seymour vs. De Lancey,
6 Johns. Ch. R. 222, S. C.; 3 Cowen, 445; Emerson vs. Kirtland,
4 Paige, 628; Olute vs. Robinson, 2 Johns. 595; Judson v. Wass,
11 Johns. 525; Van Bps vs. Corporationof Schenectady, 12 Johns.

442. The cases of Gazely vs. Price, 16 Johns. 267, and Parker
vs. Parmlee, 20 Johns. 130, are, however, exceptions.
In the first of these two cases the covenant was, "to give the
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defendant a good and sufficient deed for the premises ;" and the
Court held that this covenant was performed by the execution of a
deed, sufficient invoint of form, to convey whatever title the vendor might have. In the other ease, the plaintiff had covenanted to
execute to the defendant a "good warrantee deed of conveyance
of the premises; and it was decided that he was not bound to convey a good title, but simply to execute a deed containing a covenant
of warranty.
In Fletcher vs. Button, 4 Coms. 396, Judge liuggles reviewed
all these cases; and although it did not become necessary, in that
case, to pass definitively upon the principles adopted in 6azely
vs. Prize, and Parkervs. Parmlee, yet the learned Judge clearly
intimates, that, in his opinion, those cases could not be reconciled
either with the previous decisions, or with sound reason. In reference to the case of Parker v. Parmlee, he says: "But the reasoning in that case falls short of showing, that a covenant to execute a good and sufficient deed of conveyance, is satisfied by a deed
of conveyance which conveys nothing."
If the words of such a covenant were to be construed simply
according to their grammatical import, without reference to the
nature of the contract in which they occur, it might lead to the
conclusion arrived at in Parkervs. Parmlee. But the authorities
to which I have referred, show conclusively that, whatever may be
the' language of a vendor, in a contract for the sale of lands, the
law implies an undertaking that he has, and will convey, a good
title. In the case of Souter v. Drake, supra, the vendor, in terms,
only agreed that he would assign the lease, and deliver possession.
He offered to do both: but the Court held that he must show, in
addition to this, that the landlordhad a good title. All the cases
on this subject which have been properly decided, have been, like
this case, based not upon a grammatical or literal interpretation of
the language of the covenant, but upon the doctrine of implied
warranty, applicable to all cases of sale: in respect to which the
rule is the same, in equity and at law.
I have no hesitation, therefore, in holding that, under a covenant
like that, in this case, to execute "a good and sufficient deed of
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conveyance" of lands, a vendee has a right, if he discover the title
to be defective, to refuse to receive it; and this right is not affected
by the fict, that the defect might have been discovered at the time
of entering into the agreement to purchase, by an examination of
-the .public records. Executory agreements for the purchase of
lands are frequently made, under circumstances which afford neither
tine nor opportunity for a thorough examination; and the purchaser cannot be presumed, prior to entering into such an agreement, to have investigated the title. But, aside from this, a vendee
can never be bound, as between him and the vendor, to search the
records for defects of title. The protection of vendors from the
consequences of agreeing to sell that which they do not own, constitutes no part of the object of the recording acts: nor is it any
answer to a warranty, either express or implied, that the purchaser
might, by inquiry, have ascertained it to be false. The reason
why the imiplied warranty on the part of the vendor ceases, upon
the consummation of the contract of sale, by the execution of a
deed, is not that the vendee is presumed to have investigated the
title and discovered the defects, if any there be, but that.it is reasonable to require the vendee, in taking a deed, which is a more
solemn and deliberate act than entering into a preliminary agreement for the purchase, to protect himself by an express warranty,
agreeably to common usage. The defendant, therefore, was-not
bound to take a title to the lot, subject to the incumbrances upon
it, notwithstanding those incumbrances were on record. What,
then, in view of, these principles, were the respective rights and
duties of the parties, under their-agreement?
The defendant Jackson, upon making,,as he did, the first payment, had a rigt to require the execution of a deed by the vendors.
But in order to put them in default for not executing it, it was incumbent on him to demand execution. So on the other hand, the
vendee could not be put in default, for not executing the bond and
mortgage, pntil the vendors had made and tendered their deed.
Neither party ever made any such demand or tender. It is clear,
therefore, that at the time when the second instalment became due,
neither party could rescind, because neither had a right to treat
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the other party as having failed-in the performance of his contract.
They stood upon an"equal footing, and the contract continued obligatory upon both.
Did the non-payment of the second and subsequent instailments
-then, put the vendee or his assigns in default? Upon the doctrine.
of some of the 'eases, this question would be answered in the affirmative. But the case of Grant vs. Johnson, 1 Seld., 247, has settled
the prin6iple, ,that covenants, like those in this case, ar6 dependent,
and that the execution of the deed is a condition precedent to the
payment of the instalments subsequent to the first. The vendee, or
his assignsi therefore, were never put in default in this case. The
consequence of this conclusion is, that his right to demand the execution of a deed, upon payment of the arrearages; continued up to
the time of the sale upon the Sibley mortgage.
This sale and the conveyance under it,'put it out of the power of
the'vendors to convey any title to the purchaser. This, of course,
unde' the construction of the covehant which we hive adopted,
authorized the assignee of the vendee to treat the contract as -rescinded, unless it should be held that he wa bound still to demand
a deed. I consider it settled, however, that no such demand was
necessary.
The rule on this subject was laid down at an early day, in Sir
Anthony Main'siJase,5 Coke, 21, and seems to have been generally
adhered to since. In that case, Sir Anthony had given a bond to
his tenant to make a new lease at any time, upon the surrenderof
the old one. Being sued upon the bond, he pleaded, that the
tenant had not surrendered; to which the latter replied -that he,
Main, had conveyed away the reversion, and on demurrer, the replication was held good. It is said by Cowen, T., in Hfarrington
vs. Riggins, 17 Wend. 376, that this case was never questioned,
and he cites a number of cases, in which the same principle was
adopted. The case of Barringtonvs. Higgins, itself, does not conflict with this rule, because the covenants in that case were held to
be independent, and because the defendant in that case was guilty
of the first default.
I think it may be assumed, therefore, that the law is, that where
19
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the title of a vendor, who has contracted to convey, is totally destroyed, the yendee is not bound, either t6 -offer to perform, op his
own part; or to require performance by his vendor, but may at-once
treat the contract as rescinded.
It follows from this, that upon the sale and conveyance under
the foreclosure of the Sibley mortgage, the defendant, Jackson, h~d
an immediate cause of action against the vendors, to recover back
the money paid; and of course, that he had a good defence as
against them, to any legal proceedings to enforce the collection of
They
the note, given for the balance of the first instalment.
could have 'no just right to collect money which they would be Instantly bound to'refund to the *party from whom it was received.
No Court, and especially no Court of Equity, would -countenance
any such claim. It is not a case where the defendantis concluded
by the judgment; because the defence did not exist until long after
the judgment was recovered. No defence existed until the sale
under the Sibley mortgage. Until that event-occurred, the vendee
had no right to rescind the contract. The vendors had not been
put in default by a demand for the conveyance of the lot - and it
would have been sufficient for them, if they were able to make a
good title when required to convey, which, until the sale they might
have done, by paying off the mortgage. This conclusion renders it
unnecessary to notice any of the other points made by the counsel.
It remains only to inquire, whether there is anything in the case
to give the plaintiff, Burwell, any greater rights than the original
vendors themselves would have had. The transfer of the note to
Clark, and the recovery- of the judgment by him, could not of
course change his relations to the maker of the note, as one of the
original vendors. The same obligations which rested upon them
"
jointly, rested also upon him individually.
It is very doubtful, theretore, if Burwell were a boa.fide purchaser for a consideration paid, whether this would give him any
greater rights than Clark, the plaintiff, himself had. Possibly, however, as the defence did not exist at the time of the assignment, it
might. But it does not appear that he was such a purchaser. The
assignment expressed a nominal consideration, merely, of one dollar; and there was no proof that anything was paid.
-
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In the case of Jackson vs. Caldwel, 1 Cowen, 622, it was held
that it was not sufficient for a party, claiming to be a bona fide
purchaser, to show a conveyance ezyreearng a consideration, but he
must go further, and show a consideration actually paid. I think
this a just rule. But I do not understand it to be claimed in this
case, that Burwell was a bona fide purchaser. On the contrary, the
case states that he had become trustee for Clark; and I infer that
he held tluis judgment in his character as trustee, and not in his

own right.
This, under the views already taken, is decisive of the case. The
judgment in the Supreme Court must be reversed, and the bill in
the original suit dismissed. The prayer of the cross bill, for a perpetual injunction should be granted, and the proceedings remitted
to the Supreme Court, with instructions to carry into effect this
judgment.

In the Supreme Court of Ohio.
ROBERT DAVIDSON vs. NELSON W. GRAHAM IET AL.
1. A declaration, setting out nothing but a general or ordinary engagement by the
defendants as common carriers, is not supported by proof of a contract, containing

a special exception of the liability of the defendants for any loss which may
arise from "the damage of the river, fire, and unavoidable accident."

In such

case, the plaintiff must be non-suited on the ground of variance between pleadings
and proofs.
2. Such special exception to the defendant's liability may be lawfully created by
special contract between the parties, though it cannot be made by general notice,
known or unknown to the party engaging the services of the common carrier.

The case of Jones vs. Voorhees, 10 0. R. 146, explained.
3. Although the common carrier may by special contract restrict his liability, so far
as he is an insurer against losses by mistake or accident, he cannot thus exempt
himself from losses caused by any neglect of that- degree of diligence pertaining

to his Reculiar character as bailee.
4. The burden of proof, that the loss occurred from one of the excepted causes,

rests on the defendant.

This was an action of assumpsit, reserved by the District Court
of Muskingum county, on a motion for new trial. The opinion of
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the Court, which was delivered by Mr. Justice Bartley, shows the
facts and pleadings fully.
Jewett, Brush & Ball, for plaintiff.
Goddard&B astman, for defendant.
BARTLEY J.-This suit was' instituted to recover damages for the
loss of certain goods entrusted to the defendants as common carriers
on the Muskingum river. The declaration sets forth an undertaking
by the defendants in ordinary and general terms as'common carrierS
and owners of the steamboat "Newark," to transport the goods and
merchandise "ofthe plaintiff from Marietta to Zanesville'; avers the
defendant's failure to deliver the goods according to his understanding, and their loss on the way, by the dfendant's negligence.
The defendants pleaded the general issue.
It appears, that on the trial of the cause in the District Court,
the plaintiff, after giving evidence tending to prove that the defenz
dants were common carriers between Marietta and Zanesville, and
owners of the steamboat' Newark," offered in evidence the bill of
lading, which contained the terms of a special contract between the
parties, for the transportation of the goods in question, from
Mdrietta to Zanesville, on said steamboat, 8pecially exce7t.g tile
liability of the defendanti for the dangers of tie river, jfle, and
unavoidable accidents. But the plaintiff offered no evidence to show
"the loss of the goods within the terms of the special contract."
The Court directed the plaintiff to be non-suited. The plaintiff

excepted t&the ruling of the Court, and also moved for a new trial.
And the cause was reserved for decision here upon the questions
raised by the motion for new trial.
The ruling of the Court below is questionable on two grounds.
The first has relation to a question of variance between the proof
and the declaration as to the contract between the parties; and the
second, to the sufficiency of the proof of loss of the goods.
The declaration sets out nothing but a general or ordinary engagement on behalf of the defendants as common carriers. The evidence
offered is that of a contract containing a special exemption of the
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liability of the defendants for any loss which may arise from "the
damage of the river,fire, and unavoidableaccident." It is requisite
that a declaration on a contract, should set out the contract truly,
either in terms or by its legal import. If the defendants had the
.right to make this special exception to their ordinary liability as
common carriers, it became a material stipulation in the contract,
and as such, became an essential part of the description of the contract in the declaration. The materiality, therefore, of this special
provision in the contract, involves the much contested question,
whether the common carrierhas the right to limit Aii common law
liability, by special agreement.
This is a question of great and increasing importance, and requires
the most careful consideration. The different branches of business
connected with the various modes of transportation have been
vastly extended. And not only the facilities and means of public
conveyance, but also the actual amount of transportation, have been
so greatly increased, that the laws relating to the duties and liabilities of common carriers have acquired far more extensive application
than formerly. And it is of the utmost importance that they should
be settled with certainty and a just regard to the multiplied and
still growing interests to which they relate.
. It has been well settled, both in England and in this country, for
many years, that a common carrier is liable for all losses which do
not fall within the excepted cases of the act of God or the public
enemy. The ordinary bailee for hire, or private carrier is liable
only for neglect of ordinary care; but the common carrier is held
to a higher degree of diligence, and is not only answerable for
losses arising from slight neglect, but is in one sense an insurer of
the property entrusted to him, being responsible for losses by accident or mistake from whatever cause arising, the acts of God and
the public enemy only excepted. The loss of, or damage done to,
property entrusted to the common carrier, is of itself sufficient proof
of negligence; the maxim of the law being, that every thing is
negligence which the law does not excuse. The peculiar duty and
high responsibility which has been imposed upon the common
carrier, arise from the .public character of his employment, the
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extensive control he exercises over the property of others, ani the
facilities which he usually has for securing impunity for an abuse
of his trust. Kent's Com., Vol. IL, p. 597.
But whether the common carrier can limit this liability by
special agreement, and if so, to what extent, does not seem to be
so well settled, and there is much conflict in the decisions upon the
subject in England as well as in this country. It was held by the
Supreme Court of New York, in Gould vs. Hill, 2 Hill Rep. 625,
that the common carrier is restrained by public policy from limiting
his liability by express agreement. And this doctrine has been
recognized, at least, as law by the Courts of several of the other
States. Fish, &c., vs. Ro88, 2 Kelly, (Geo.) R. 349. Thomas vs.
Boston & Prov. Railroad Co., 10 Met. (Mass.) R. 479. 'And in
the case of ones vs. Voorhees, 10 Ohio Rep. 145, this doctrine was
also recognized in the Supreme Court of this State; but that decision
went no further than to decide that the proprietors of stage-coaches
are common carriers, and, as such, cannot limit their own responsibility by .actualnotice to a traveler, that his baggage 'is. at his own
risk. The principle really settled in this case we feel no disposition
to disturb, but some of the language used in the opinion needs
qualification.
Many of the questions which have engaged the attention of
courts touching this subject, have arisen upon alleged implied contracts, or rathe'r upon the validity and- effect of written or printed
notices given by common carriers in the course of their public employment, announcing a limitation upon the carrier's liability for
property entrusted to him. The validity of such notices was not
recognized in Westminster Hall until the decision of the case of
Nicholson vs. Willan, 5 East, 507, in the year 1804. But the
doctrine became gradually and firmly established in England, until
Parliament at length interfered, and by statutory'provision controlled the effect of these notices, and restored the operation of the
common law. Stat. 1 Will. 4, ch. 68. The adjudications in this
country have generally shown a firm adherence to the strictness of
the common law rule in regard to the responsibility of-common carriers, and an inclination, to restrict, and, in some of the States, to in-
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validate the effect of notices upon that liability. It is held, in Pennsylvania, that although a common carrier may limit his responsibility'by a general notice, yet, the terms of the notice must be clear

and explicit,'and the person with whom the carrier deals must be
fully informed of the terms and effect of-it. Camden and Amboy
B. B1. Co. vs. Baldauf,16 Penn. St. Rep. 67. But in New York it is
settled that the common carrier cannot restrict his liability by a general notice, even though the notice be clearly brought to the knowledge
of the owner. Cole vs. aoodwin, 19 Wend. 251; Hollister vs.
Nowlan, lb. 235; Wells vs. The Steam Navigation Co., 2 Comst.
R. 204. This rule, which has been adopted also in several other
States, and by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case
of The New Jersey Steam Navigation Company vs. The Merchants'
Bank of Boston, 6 How. 344, fully sustains the principle decided
in Ohio in the case of Jones vs. Voorhees, so far as it relates to the
effect of the notice upon the carrier's liability.
The ground upon which the validity or effect of a notice to restrict
the liability of a common carrier, is sought to be maintained, is that
it amounts to a proposal of special terms in the engagement, and
that the assent of the owner or employer will be presumed or implied. This reason is noticed by Mr. Justice iNelson, in the opinion
in the case of New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. vs. Merchants'
Bank, in the following language: "But admitting the right thus to
restrict his obligation, it by no means follows that he can do so by

any act of his own. He is in the exercise of a sort of public office,
and has public duties to perform, from which he should not be permitted to exonerate himself without the assent of the parties concerned. And this is not to be implied or inferred from a general
notice to the public, limiting his obligation, which may or may not
be assented to. He is bound to receive and carry all the goods
offered for transportation, subject to all the responsibilities incident
to his employment, and is liable to an action in case of refusal.
And we agree with the Court in the case of Hollister vs. Nowlan,
that, if any implication is to be indulged from the delivery of the
goods under the general notice, it is as strong that the owner
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intended to insist upon-his rights, and the duties of the carrier, as
it is that he assented to their qualification."
In a matter of this nature, we think, that the assent of the owner
or employer is not to be implied, and cannot reasonably be pre8umed from a notice, in the absence of proof of an express agree*
ment. And we hold it to be settled in Ohio, at least, that the common carrier cannot restrict his liability by notice, verbal, writteni or
printed, even when brought to the knowledge of the owner or employer.
But the question recurs, where an express agreement between the
parties actually exists, restricting the liability of the common carrier, is it wholly invalid ? Upon what principle can it be rendered
invalid ? There is no incapacity in the parties to contract; neither
is there any criminal or immoral element entering into. the nature
of the contract.- The particular transaction to which'it relates,
involving simply the rights of property, and the service of the safe
custody, carriage and delivery of goods, contains no element of illegality, and does not, perhaps, so far as that particular instance is
concerned, injuriously affect the public interests, any more than the
ordinary engagement of an insurer of goods, to which, in one
respect, the engagement of, the common carrier is analogous. But
it is said, that a stipulated restriction upon the. common carrier's
liability, contravenes a principle of public policy-that the common
carrier is in the exercise of a public employment, and that to allow
him to stipulate for his own carelessness, or by special contract to
provide impunity for his own misconduct or omissions of duty,
would encourage negligence and open a wide door to fraud, in a
business extensively affecting the commerce and interests of the
community at large.
The liability of the common carrier, however, extends beyond
that of losses by his own default or omissions of duty. le is liable
for losses .by accident, mistake, and numerous unavoidable occurrences, not falling within either of the two excepted perils, and
against which it is not within the reach of human vigilance or foresight to provide. If the loss happen by the wrongful act of a third
person; by an accidental fire, not caused by lightning; by the
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agency of the propelling power in a steamship; by mistaking a
light; by the goods being taken by robbers, or destroyed by a mob
through force, which neither the carrier nor his agents could resist;
or any other of the many unavoidable circumstances not within the
two common law exceptions, the carrier is held liable. In the case
of Riley vs. Horne, 5 Bing. 217, Mr. Chief Justice Best, in discussing the extent of the common carrier's liability, uses the following forcible language: "When goods are Aelivered to a carrier,
they are usually no longer under the eye of the owner; he seldom
follows or sends any servant with them to the place of their destination. If they should be lost or injured by the grossest negligence
of the carrier or his servants, or stolen by them, or by thieves in
collusion with them, the owner would be unable to prove either of
these causes of loss. His witnesses must be the carrier's servants ;
and they,' knowing that they could not be contradicted, would
excuse their masters and themselves. To give due security to property, the law has, therefore, added to that responsibility of a
carrier, which immediately arises out of his contract to carry for a
reward,,namely} that of taking all reasonable care of it, the resp6nsibility of an insurer. From his liability as an insurer, the carrier
is only to be relieved by two things, both so well known to all the
country, when they happen, that no person would be so rash as to
attempt to prove that they had happened when they had not;
namely, the act of God and the king's enemies."
The liabilities of a common carrier may be distinguished into two
distinct classes,, according to their nature. The one, a liability for
losses by neglect on the part of the carrier or his agents, which is
the liability of a bailee, arising from omission of duty. The other,
a liability for losses by accident, mistake, or other unavoidable
occurrence, without any actual fault on the part of the carrier;
which is the liability of an insurer,and founded upon a principle of
the common law. No principle of public policy would seem to be
contravened by a special contract restricting the liability of the
common carrier for losses not arising from any neglect or fault on
his part. Here he would not be stipulating for his own carelessness, or providing impunity for misconduct or any omission of duty
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on his part. And it would appear reasonable that he should be

allowed the means of protection to himself against misfortune, by
limiting his liability as an insurer. Besides, the owner may -prefer
selecting his own insurer. The carrier may be unable to respond
in case of loss. And if no restriction of this kind on his liability
can be made by agreement, the owner would be subjected to the
necessity of paying the carrier for his risk as insurer, and also for
paying a premium to another for protection against the same loss
for which the carrier is liable.
The right of the'common carrier to restrict his common law liability by special agreement, is founded upon' sound reason, and is
fully sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States, in~the
case of Tre NVew Jersey Steam Navigatiorn Company vs. Merchants'

Bank, 6 How. 344. And the same doctrine is sanctioned by the
greater weight of authority in this country and also in -England.
The contract of the common carrier, therefore, restricting his
liability, is not invalidated by public policy, but merely limited in
its -operation. The common carrier has the right to restrict his
common law liability by special contract; and this extends t9 all
losses not arising from his own neglect or omission of duty. He
cannot, however, protect himself by contract from losses occasioned
by his own fault. He exercises a public employment, and diligence
and good faith in the discharge of his duties are essential to the
public interests. He is held to extraordinary diligence, that is,
that degree of diligence which very careful and prudent men take
of their own affairs. And he is responsible for all losses arising
from a neglect of that high degree of diligence enjoined on him by
his public employment. And public policy forbids that he should
be relieved by special agreement from that degree of diligence and
fidelity which the law has exacted in the discharge of his duties.
All public agents are held to this high degree of diligence in the
discharge- of their trusts; and they are never allowed to contract
for a less degree of diligence and fidelity than that which the law
imposes. Any such contract would be regarded as illegal or against
public policy, and therefore void. If a public agent can, by special
contract, provide that -heshall be held to, or made responsible only
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for ordinary diligence in the discharge of his duties, he can of course
go further, and provide that he shall not be answerable for more
than slight diligence, or indeed for any degree of neglect, or the
consequences of any misconduct in the performance of his task.
The law fixes the degree of diligence required of the common carrier as a public agent, and this he cannot change by special contract. The proposition that he could do so, would imply that a
public agent could contract in consideration of his own future malfeasance or nonfeasance in the performance of his trust. The
degree of diligence required by law of the common, carrier, is a
matter over which he has no control, and in which the public is
interested.
It has been held, that where the liability of a common carrier
has been restricted by agreement, he is to be 'regarded in respect
to that particular transaction, as not in the exercise of his public
employment, but as an ordinary bailee for hire, and, therefore,
liable only for a neglect of ordinary diligence. The reason upon
which this opinion rests is not satisfactory. It is not true that the
character of the employment-is changed by such contract, and the
carrier is not and cannot in fact be regarded as a mere private
bailee for hire. He is still a common carrier, and not at liberty to
refuse to perform his duties as such, even in regard to the particular
transaction to which the contract relates.
In consequence of the nature of his employment, and its connection with the public interests, the common carrier is held to a higher
degree of diligence than the private carrier. And he cannot be
allowed, with proper regard for the public safety, to relieve himself
to any extent from that care and diligence which has been enjoined
upon him from considerations of great public interest. We are
unanimous in holding that the common carrier cannot relieve himself to any extent by special contract, from losses occasioned by his
own neglect; and that, although he may, by contract, restrict his
liability as an insurer,yet that he cannot stipulate for a less degree
of care and diligence, in the discharge of his duty, than that which
pertains to his peculiar trust as a bailee.
The special stipulation in the contract offered in evidence in this
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case, was, therefore, valid and material, and should have been set
out in the declaration as part of the contract. Upon this ground
there was a fatal variance between the proof and the declaration.
2. On the subject of the sufficiency of the proof-of the loss of the
goods inthis case, the facts do not appear as fully as desirable. It
seems, however, that the delivery of the goods to the defendants
and the non-delivery of the same at the place of destination were
not in dispute, and were admitted by the parties on the trial.. And
by the statement, that "the plaintiff offered no evidence to show the
loss of the goods within the terms of the special contrapt," we
understand is meant, that he offered noevidence to show that the
loss did- not fall within the special exceptions to the defendants'
liability in the contract. The question which arises, therefore, is,
whether it is incumbent on the owner of the goods, in case of exceptions to the liability of the common carrier by special contract, to
prove that the loss did not-fall within the exceptions.
The rule of evidence which is applicable hiere, has been very
clearly and definitely settled. Proof that goods entrusted to a
common earrier have never been delivered, either to the bailer or to
the consignee, is prima facie evidence of loss by negligence, and
sufficient-to charge the carrier. In all cases of loss, the onus probandi is on the carrier to bring his liability within any special exemption; for it is said, that prima facie, the law imposes the obligation of safety on him. Angell on he Law of Carriers, sec.. 202;
Story on Bailments, sec. 529. Mr. Greenleaf, in his work on Evidence, vol. 2, sec. 219, says: "In all cases of loss by a common
carrier,the burden of proof is on him, to show that the loss was
occasioned by the act of God or by public enemies. And if the
acceptance of the goods was special, the burden of proof is still on
the carrier, to show, not only that the cause of the -loss was within
the terms of the exception, but also that there was, on his part, no
negligence or want of due care. Thus, where goods were delivered
on board a steamboat, and the bill of lading contained an exception
of ' the dangers of the river,' and the loss was occasioned by the
boat's striking on a sunken rock; it was held incumbent on the
carrier to prove that due diligence and proper skill were used to
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avoid the accident." This doctrine is founded on sound reason and
fully sustained by authority. W iteaide vs. Russell, 8 Watts &
Serg. 44.
In this case, therefore, the burden of showing the loss to have
been produced by a cause falling within the exceptions rested upon
thea defendants. The non-delivery of the goods by the defendants
according to the bailment, was sufficient primafacie evidence on the
part of the plaintiff.
Upbn the ground of variance, however, between the proof-and the
declaration, the District Court was correct in its ruling. The
motion for a new trial is, therefore, overruled.

In the Sureme Court of Pennsylvania.
CHDS & CO. vs. DIGBY.

1

The goods of a non-resident debtor, in the hands of a person residing in this
State, are liable to be held by a writ of foreign attachment, although the goods
themselves are in another'State.

Error to the District Court of Allegheny Comity.
This was a foreign attachment issued against Thomas Scandrett,
December 17th, 1851, in which William Digby, the defendant below
and in error, was made garnishee. The writ was served upon the
garnishee, December 18th, 1851. Judgment by default was rendered against the defendant, Scandrett, and the plaintiffs proceeded
to trial against the garnishee, on the plea of nulla bona.
On the trial, the following facts were established by the evidence: For two years prior to November, 1851, Thomas Scandrett
had carried on a clothing store at Youngstown, in the, State of
Ohio. William Digby had furnished him goods, in pursuance of
an agreement under seal, dated September 27th, 1849, in which it
was stipulated, that, if at any time Scandrett should be indebted
to Digby, it should be lawful for said Digby to enter the said
We are indebted to the Pittsburg Legal Intelligencer for this case.-Ed. Am.
Reg.
e.
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store, and take such.portion of the goods 8od by him to Scandrett, as would be suffieent to satisfy his claim. In July, 1851,
Scandrett left his store in charge of a salesman, with instructions
to carry on the business, and went on a trading expedition to Lake
Superior.
On the 21st day of November, 1851, the stock in the store consisted of a large amount of goods purchased from Digby, and other
goods purchased from other persons; which other goods were valued
at $689 26. On that day, Digby, by virtue of the agreement
above recited, took into his possession all the goods purchased from
him by Scandrett, and the salesman delivered to him the balance
of the stock, amounting to $689 26, and executed a chattel-mortgage for it, to secure the balance of his claim, which was considerably more than the value of the entire stock. No authority
was shown to the salesman to execute the mortgage, or dispose of
the entire stock at wholesale. In April, 1852, after the service of
the foreign attachment, Scandrett ratified the act of his agent, the
salesman, considering it the best thing that could be done.
The Court below, WiLLIAms, Assistant Juidge, charged the jury
that the matter and thing attached must be in the power and-jurisdiction of the Court, and referred to the case of C'hritmas vs.
Biddle, and that the attachment would not lie. After a verdict in
favor of defendant, this instruction was assigned for error.
Shaler &-Co., for plaintiff in error, cited several authorities to
show that the salesman exceeded his powers, and that his act did not
convey the property in the goods to Digby, 2 Harris, 105; 18 Johns.
362. There was no question made as to the goods which Digby
had sold to Scandrett. The question whether the goods were
bound by the writ, depended on the construction of the law regulating foreign attachments.
Todd and Smith, for defendant in error, cited Story's Confl.
Laws, § 539; 1 Harris, 223.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Luwis, J.-The observation of Mr. Justice Coulter, in Christmas vs. Biddle, 1 Harris, 223, that the attachment process is a
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proceeding in rem, and the matter and thing attached must he in
the power and jurisdiction of the Court, must be taken with some
qualification. It is true, that "the attachment process is a proceeding in rem;" but, it is equally true, that it is something more.
It is also a proceeding against the garnishee, personally, for the
purpose of compelling him to answer for the value, where the
thing itself is not produced. The summons, the judgment and the
execution, contain the bones and sinews of a proceeding in Personam, against the garnishee, by means of which his own estate
may be taken in execution, if he fail to "1answer interrogatories,"
or "1to produce the goods and effects of the defendant" found to
be in his hands or possession, or "neglect to pay the debt attached,
if the same be due and payable." The ultimate object of the
proceeding is to appropriate the debtor's assets to the payment of
his debts, and this object is one which ought to be favored. It
may be accomplished wherever the courts have jurisdiction over
the person who has the actual possession of the property, and the
power to dispose of it according to their direction, or wherever the
property itself may be taken into actual possession by the officers
of the law. Real estate follows the law of its 8itu8, and bank
stock that of its creation. Where the one is located in a foreign
jurisdiction, or the other created by a foreign law, neither is the
subject of attachment here in the hands of one who has neither
possession, nor title, but simply a naked power to sell. Chri8tmas
vs. Biddle, 1 Harris, 223. But this is not the case with ordinary
goods and effects. In general, any one having possession of goods
or effects, may surrender them in obedience to a judgment in a
foreign attachment, although they may happen to be within a
foreign jurisdiction at the time the writ was issued.. The possession of them gives the power of removal and surrender.. While
this exists in the garnishee, there is no reason why he should not
be compelled to exercise it in furtherance of the object of the law,
and in advancement of justice. It was thought, at one time, that
a foreign attachment would not-lie on a debt contracted out of the
jurisdiction. 2 Show. 373; Lord Raym. 346. But this was afterwards denied, and it was held that the debt always follows the
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person of the debtor, and it is not material where it was contracted.
Andrews vs. Clarke, Carthew, 25. In personal property the Uz
loci rei site is not to be recognized. All that is required to sustain
the proceedings against the gahishee, is, that he be within the
jurisdiction of the Court when the writ was- served, and that the
property attached be in his hands or possession." The Court was
in error, in directing the jnr that the attachmbnt would not lie for
goods delivered to Digby in Ohio.
This disposes of the only point determined by the, District
Court; but, as the cause goes back, it is proper to express our
opinion on the other points. A stranger has no right to object that
an agent exceeded his power, 5 Johns. R. 44. But, where an agent
exceeds his authority, and an interest has attached in favor of another, a subsequent ratification will not divest such interest, 5 East,
491. Where an agent exceeds his authority, the principal is bound
to disavow it the first moment the fact comes to his knowledge, or
he makes the act his own, 14 S. & R. 27. The first, second and
third points ought-to have been answered in .the affirmative.
,As we -do not see how an affirmative answer to the fourth would
have sustained the attachment, or otherwise have benefited the
plaintiff, it was not error to refuse to answer it. If Digby is chargeable with the goods as assignee in trust for creditors, the present is
not the form of proceeding in which that trust can be enforced.
Judgment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.

In the Supreme Cout of Pennsylvania.
PHILLIPS ZT AL. VS. DUNOAN.
Where aMechanic'slienwasfiledformaterialsfurnishedatdifferent dates within two
years prior to the filing of the claim, it was hdd, thatin the absence of a special contract, no recovery could be had on the scire facias, except for materials furnished
within six months prior to the filing of the lien.

Error to District Court of Allegheny county.
This was a scire facias sur mechanics' lien filed for materials fir_
nished during the year. 1850 and 1851. On the 2d of May 1854,
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a verdict was rendered for-the plaintiff below and defendant in error,
for the whole amount of his claim, subject to the opinion of the
Court upon the question, whether the lien filed in this case is sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover; and also, whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the items of lumber and materials furnished more than six months before the filing of the lien. And if
the Court should be of the opinion, that the law is with the plaintiff
on both questions, then judgment to be entered in his favor upon
the verdict. If the Court should be of opinion that the law is with
the plaintiff on the first point and not on the second, the judgment
to be entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $26 5,6, with
interest from August 2, 1851; but if the Court should.be of opinion
that the law is with the defendants, then judgment to be entered in
their favor, non obstante veredicto.

The Court rendered judgment for the plaintiff below on both
points.
Two errors were assigned, the first to the insufficiency of the
description, which is set forth distinctly in the opinion of the Court.
The second was to the entry of judgment for items which were furnished more than six months prior to the filing of the lien.
The case was argued by
Darra and Mellon for plaintiff in error, and by
. Ha8brouck, -Vq., for defendant in error.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
WOODWARD, J.-The first error assigned is not sustained. The lien
is sufficiently certain. In Barclay's Appeal, 1 Harris, 495, there
was nothing on record to show to what buildings the materials fur.
nished, were applied. Here there is. We have a bill of specification,
charged to have been furnished for two certain two-storied brick
houses, (particularly described) with the ground on which they stand,
anid said to belong to Elias Phillips, and Mary his wife. This individuates the buildings with reasonable certainty, and that is all
thei act of Assembly requires.
But the second error is, we think, well- assigned.
The account filed shows that of the materials furnished, $25 53
worth only were supplied within six months before the lien was en20
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tered-all the rest were furnished beyond that period. Where
materials are furnished under a special cbntrast, as for the brick or
lumber of a particular house, the lien may be entered within six
months after the delivery of the last items, for that is the completion of
the contract, (7 Harris, 341) ; but a contractor who goes to a lumber
merchant, and obtains lumber as he needs it for the job in hand,
makes a new contract at each purchase, and the statute bars all of
the account more than six months old at the filing of the lien. Such
seems to have been the case here. No special contract was shown,
and there is no allegation that all the materials were furnished within
the six months, as in 2 Harris, 56, and ibid. 167. The copy of the
account filed shows that they were not, and, therefore, for so much
of his claim as represents materials furnished before. that period,
the plaintiff ought not to have judgment.
The judgment is reversed, and judgment is entered here for the
plaintiff for $25 53, with interest from 1st July, 1854, and costs.

In the Supreme Court of Texas.
MIGUEL YENDO ET AL. v8. JESSE WHEELER ET AL.1
1. Where land is.sold under a tax-law, it is necessary that every pre-requisite in the
statute should be strictly complied with; otherwise, the purchaser under the
tax-sale will take no title.
2. An assessment to be valid under the Texas statute, with a view of collecting the
taxes, must embrace a true description of the land, together with" the name of
the actual owner, whether resident or non-resident, and such other descriptive
matter as will apprise the owner that his land is about to be sold for taxe.
-

The opinion of the Court, in which the facts appear, was delivered by
WHxELEn, J.-The plaintiffs brought their action of trespass to
try title to a league of land. They claimed as heirs of Manuel
Yendo and his wife, Casiana Zambrano, under a title issued by the
Commissioner of De Leon's colony, in 1833. The defendant
. I This case has been kindly furnished us by a professional friend in Galveston,
Texas, who assures us that the subject discussed is of much practical impork m
to our subscribers in that section of the Union.-Ed. Am. L. Reg.
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claimed under a purchase made at a sale of the land for taxes, in 1850.
The plaintiffs gave in evidence the grant to -Zambrano, and proved
that they were the heirs of the grantee, and that her husband,
Manuel Yendo, died in 1828 or 1829. The defendants introduced,
as evidence of titles in themselves, the deed of the assessor and collector of the county, bearing date on the 22d day of August, 1850,
made in pursuance of a sale for the taxes for the year 1849. The
deed recites the levy was made "upon the following property of the
said M. Yendo, to wit: 4428 acres of land lying and situated on
the Garcitas creek, adjoining the land of R. Rios and F. De Leon,
as will appear by reference to the map of the county of Victoria"
The deed purports to convey "all the right title and interest of the
said M. Yendo, or of any other owner or claimant of the same unknown, under him, in and to the above described premises." -The
assessor testifies that he sold the land as the property of M. Yendo
a non-resident delinquent tax payer, from information derived from
the map of the county. That the' land was marked on the map as
belonging to M. Yendo, and did not appear, by the records, to be
claimed by any one else. He further testified, at the instance of
the plaintiffs, that he levied on the land, by virtue of his tax list, of
whidh he had- three copies, that he had a rough draft of the nonresident delinquent tax payers, not on his alphabetical list, but on a
separatepiece of paper; that these three rolls were not exact copies
of this list; that he had forwarded to the proper office at Austin
one of the copies, and had deposited one in the county clerk's office,
retaining one himself; he did not recollect, whether he had kept or
destroyed the rough draft. The plaintiffs objected to the introduction in evidence of the assessor's deed, but their objection was
overruled. After the assessor had given his testimony, they moved
the court to exclude the deed, which the court refused. The plaintiffs asked, among others, the following instructions, which were refused by the court, viz: "That the requirements of the assessment
law must be strictly complied with, and that any material variance
therefrom, when proved, is fatal to a deed made by virtue of a tax
sale. 2d: That where it is shown that the assessor failed to state in
his assessment roll the number of acres and the patentee or person
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for whom the original survey was made, it is a fatal defect in the
sale made under such assessment." There was a verdit for the
defendant, a motion for a new trial overruled,- and judgment on the
verdict; and the plaintiffs appealed.
The question to be determined is as to the validity of the title of'
the defendants, acquired by. their purchase at the sale of the land
for taxes. To vest a title in the purchaser, the officer must h~ve
the power to sell, and the requirements of the law must have been
complied with in making the sale. The, authority of the officer to
sell land for the non-payment of taxes, under the laws conferring
the authority, is, in the language of the court in Williams vs. Peyton, 4 Wheat. 77, "a naked power, not coupled with an interest; and
in all such cases the law requires that every.pre-requisite to. the
exercise of. that power must precede its exercise, that the agent
must pursue the power, or his act will not be sustained by it." This
principle was recognized in the case of Hadley vs. Tankersly,
.1 Texas Rep. And it was held that under the act of 1840 which
did not make the deed prima facie evidence of the regularity of the
sale, the party claiming under it must prove that all the pre-requisities of the law had been complied with in making such sale." This
statute does not dispense with a compliance with the requirements
of the law by the officers,, or relieve the purchaser from the effect
of a non-compliance; but only changes the burden of proof from
the purchaser to the party impeaching his title; it is as necessary
to the validity of the title now as it was, before this statute was
enacted, that all the pre-requisites of the law should have been complied with. The principle, that the officer must exercise his authority strictly in conformity to law or his act will be invalid and will
vest no title in the purchaser, is not affected by the statute. But it
makes his deed prima facie evidence of the regularity of the sale,
and throws upon the party impeaching the title of the purchaser,
the necessity of proving that the requirements of the-law were not
complied with in making the sale. A distinction has been taken by
counsel for the appellant between'the power to sell, and tha regularity of the sale; and thpre, manifestly, is a clear distinction. The
proceedings in making the sale may be regular, aiLd the sale inef-
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f6ectual to pass the title for the want of power in the officer to make
it. This distinction has been recognized by the Supreme Court of
New York, inthe cases cited by counsel; and it is there held, that
the statute of the State, which makes the deed conclusive evidence
of the, regularity of the sale, and declared that it shall vest in the
grantee an absolute estate in fee simple, applies only to the proceedings to be had, after the right and power to sell are acquired.
2 Comstock, 66; 18 Johns. 441. To empower the assessor to sell,
there must have been a legal assessment of the taxes, and a failure
to pay them; and there are other provisions of the law which must
have been complied with, before the right and power to sell will
have been acquired. Hart. Dig. arts. 3133, 3136, 3137, 3138,
3150.
It is not necessary here to determine, whether the assessor's deed
is primafacie evidence under the act of 1848, before cited, of the
existence of those facts, or that the requirements of the law were
not complied with; and the decision of this case turns upon the
inquiry, whether the evidence establishes such non-compliance with
the requirements of the law. That it does, will, we think, be
apparent by a comparison of the provisions of the law with the
acts done by the officer in one or two essential particulars. The
statute provides that all property shall be assessed "in the name
of the owner, if known, and if not, then it shall be assessed by a
description of the property; if lands, it shall be described by the
number of the tract, quantity of acres, and to whom patented."
Hart. Dig. art. 3137. The statute thus, plainly requires that the
land shall be assessed in the name of the owner, if known; but if
he be unknown, it must be assessed by a description of the land.
It provides what that description shall contain, and one of its
essential constituents is the name of the grantee. The assessment
in this case was made in the name of the supposed owner, M.
Yendo. This, however, was a mistake. Manuel Yendo was neither
the owner nor the grantee. He had died several years before the
grant was made. Casiana Zambrano was the grantee, and the
owners were her heirs, the present plaintiffs. It is manifest, therefore, that the land was not assessed, either in the name of the

-
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owner, or by such a description as the statute requires; that it is
one embracing, among many other particulars mentioned, the name
of the grantee. That it should have been in the one mode or the
other, clearly was necessary to the validity of the assessment. It
may be said that it was the fault of the plaintiffs, that their title
was not recorded in the county; and it is true that it should have
been so recorded. But if this afforded an excuse for not knowing
who the owners were, it afforded none for not giving a correct
description of the land by the name of the grantee. This could
have been easily ascertained by reference to the abstract of original
titles. The owners are not accountable for mistakes made in the
county map, in causing which they had no agency. The statute
further requires of the assessor to make out "three descriptive
lists of all taxable property in his county, on which the taxes
remain unpaid, belonging to non-residents, who shall be named, if
known; if unknown, shall be so described: one of which lists shall
be filed in the office of the clerk of the county court of his county.
Another shall be posted at the court-house door of said county,
and the other shall be transmitted to the comptroller of the public
accounts. Ibid. art. 3150. The assessor testifies that he made
out three copies of his tax-list, one of which he forwarded to the
-proper officer at Austin, and one lie deposited in the county clerk's
office, retaining the other himself. It appears, therefore, that instead of posting up one copy at the court-house door, as the law
required, he retained it in his possession. This was a material
departure from the requirement of the law; one object of which
was to apprise the owner that his land was to be subjected to sale
for the taxes, and to afford him an opportunity of preventing the
sale by prompt payment. In the case of Zallman vs. Whrite,
2 Comstock, 66, a case in point, the Court of Appeals of New
York held this language: "An accurate designation or description of the land assessed is essential to the validity of the assessment. The assessment of non-residents' lands is made with the
ultimate view of collecting the tax, by advertisement and sale of
the land, if it should not be voluntarily paid. The controller's
sale is a rigorous proceeding. It divests the owner of his title
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Without his consent, and often for a very trivial consideration; and
the Legislature has, therefore, shown a cautious solicitude that it
should not be done without his knowledge." The assessment must
contain a true description of the land, in order that the purchaser
may be enabled to know what land he is purchasing, and that the
owner may know, from the advertisement required to precede the
sale, that his land is exposed to sale, and that he may save it by
paying the tax. If the land be misdescribed in the assessment, it
will, of course, be misdescribed in the controller's and county
clerk's offices, and in the notices and advertisements. The mistake
and falsity of description in the assessment necessarily runs
through, and invalidates all the subsequent proceedings. In the
case cited, it was said: "An assessment of non-resident land is
fatally defective and void, if it contains such a falsity in the designation or description of the parcel assessed as might probably
mislead the owner, and prevent him from ascertaining by the
notices that his land was to be sold or redeemed. Such a mistake
or falsity defeats one of the obvious and just purposes of the
statute, that of giving to the owner an opportunity of preventing
the sale by paying the tax."
It is obvious that the misdescription of the lahd in this case was
calculated to mislead It is not to be supposed that an advertisement of the land of M. Yendo, would apprise those claiming title
under a grant to Casiana Zambrano, that theirs was the land
intended. To hold their title divested by a sale under such circumstances, would be to defeat the manifest intention of the Legislature, in the various provisions made to protect the right of the
owner of land liable to be sold for the non-payment of taxes. But
if the title were not obnoxious to this objection, there is another
which must be held fatal to the right of the defendant, under his
deed from the assessor. The deed professed to convey only the
"right, title and interest of M. Yendo, or of any other owner or
claimant of the same, unknown, under him." If the deed had
assumed to convey the title of the unknown owner, without reference to its derivation, or the person under whom he claimed, and
the proceedings had been otherwise regular, it might have been

